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THE VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE 
(TEMPORARY MEASURES) ACT 2011: 
AN UNPRECEDENTED LICENCE TO 
SEARCH? 
Harriet Bush* 
This article examines the Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act 2011 which was 
passed as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in the case Hamed v R. This Act provided that a 
search was not unlawful simply because video surveillance was used. The article explores the 
previous court decisions on the lawfulness of police use of covert video surveillance in order to 
ascertain whether the premise upon which the Act was based, that video surveillance was lawful 
before Hamed v R, was correct. It then looks at the ratio decidendi of Hamed v R and the potential 
wider implications of this judgment. Finally, it assesses the state of the law under the Video Camera 
Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act and whether this Act limited the right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure which is contained in s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990.  
I  INTRODUCTION  
Within the last 20 years, the use of covert video surveillance has become a common police 
investigative technique in New Zealand and around the world. In 2011, for example, the New 
Zealand Police deployed an average of 47 cameras in 20 different operations each month.1 Despite 
the frequency with which this tool is now deployed, the legislature has been slow to regulate its use 
and, until recently, the appropriateness of deploying a camera in any given situation has been left 
largely to the discretion of the police.2 This has been made possible by the fact that despite several 
challenges to the lawfulness of the use of such surveillance, the courts have avoided answering the 
  
*  This article was submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. I 
would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Claudia Geiringer, for her invaluable guidance. 
1  Justice and Electoral Committee Special Report Providing the Uncorrected Transcripts from the Hearings 
of Evidence on the Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill (3 October 2011) at 74. 
2  Law Commission Search and Surveillance Powers (NZLC R97, 2007) at [11.9] and [11.25]. 
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question of whether video surveillance constitutes a "search" as the term is used in s 21 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and, if it does constitute a search, in what 
circumstances its use would be unreasonable.3 
In September 2011, however, the Supreme Court of New Zealand addressed some aspects of the 
matter in Hamed v R (Hamed).4 The majority of the Court found the use of video surveillance on 
private land unlawful and, in the circumstances of that case, an unreasonable search in breach of s 
21 of NZBORA.5 The Crown claimed that this decision was a departure from the previous law on 
video surveillance. 6  In response to this decision it immediately enacted the Video Camera 
Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act 2011 (Temporary Act). This Act provided that a search 
would not be unlawful for the sole reason that video surveillance was used.7 The Act remained in 
place for six months until April 2012 when the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 was passed.8 This 
new Act revamped New Zealand's laws in relation to surveillance, providing a detailed warrant 
regime governing, and placing statutory limits on, the use of video surveillance.9  
This article aims to examine and critique the Temporary Act. This Act is important because it 
demonstrates the action that the Crown is prepared to take in response to a decision of the Supreme 
Court with which it disagrees, and it sets a precedent for such reactive legislation in the future. The 
type of precedent that this legislation sets depends upon two key factors. The first is whether the 
reasons put forward by the Crown justifying legislative action represented a correct assessment of 
the legal position. The second is whether the act adequately fulfilled its purpose. Immediate 
legislative action was justified on the assertions that the use of covert video surveillance had been 
pronounced lawful to some extent prior to the decision in Hamed, that the decision in Hamed was a 
departure from this existing precedent and that this decision seriously limited the police's ability to 
use covert video surveillance during current and future investigations. The purpose of the temporary 
legislation was to allow the police to lawfully continue to use covert video surveillance without 
impinging on the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. If these assertions are 
  
3  See R v Fraser [1997] 2 NZLR 442 (CA) at 49; R v Gardiner (1997) 15 CRNZ 131 (CA) at 134. 
4  Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305. 
5  At [51] per Elias CJ, [159] and [178] per Blanchard J, [227] per Tipping J, [263] per McGrath J and [281] 
per Gault J.  
6  Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill 2011 (333-1), cl 3(c); (27 September 2011) 676 
NZPD 21425. 
7  Christopher Finlayson "Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill to be Introduced" (press 
release, 26 September 2011); Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act 2011, s 5(2).  
8  Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act, s 5(1); Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 2. 
9  Search and Surveillance Act, ss 45–57. 
 THE VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE (TEMPORARY MEASURES) ACT 2011: AN UNPRECEDENTED LICENCE TO SEARCH? 223 
 
 
correct and the legislation fulfilled this purpose then the legislation can be seen as a relatively 
insignificant measure temporarily restoring important investigative powers to the police. 
This article will first set out the necessary background information on covert video surveillance, 
the decision in Hamed and the key provisions of the Temporary Act. The second Part of the article 
will critique the justifications for the legislation by examining the precedent on the lawfulness of 
covert video surveillance in New Zealand. The third Part will assess the impact of the decision in 
Hamed. Finally, the article will look at the provisions of the Act itself and the extent to which the 
Act was consistent with s 21 of NZBORA. 
This article will conclude that the Act was based upon an incorrect assessment of the previous 
state of the law on video surveillance and a misreading of the scope of the judgment in Hamed. The 
Act was poorly drafted and was both over and under-reaching. Ultimately the Act cannot be read as 
consistent with s 21 of NZBORA. It thus sets a worrying precedent for the enactment of knee-jerk 
legislation premised not only on an incorrect assessment of the legal position but which has serious 
implications for a fundamental protected right. 
II  BACKGROUND 
Before any critique of the Temporary Act is attempted, it is necessary to briefly examine the 
provisions of the legislation which show what it is that the Act purported to do. In order to provide 
the contextual information necessary for this legislation to be examined, this Part shall first define 
what is meant by covert video surveillance. Then, as the Act was a response to this decision, this 
Part shall briefly outline the facts of the Hamed decision. The decision itself shall be examined in 
more detail later in the article.  
A The Use of Covert Video Surveillance in Police Investigations  
Covert video surveillance refers to the use of a video camera for surveillance by law 
enforcement officers that is intended to be hidden from the view of those who are observed.10 In the 
context of this article, it refers to surveillance targeted at a particular individual or individuals as 
part of a police investigation.11 There are two types of covert video surveillance: trespassory and 
non-trespassory surveillance. Tresspassory surveillance occurs when the camera is situated on 
private land without the knowledge or consent of the occupier of that land. It is generally conducted 
as part of a search warranted by s 198 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957.12 Non-trespassory 
  
10  See for example Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act, s 5(1). 
11  Indiscriminate public surveillance is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of the issues raised by 
this type of surveillance see Derek Lai "Public Video Surveillance by the State: Policy, Privacy Legislation 
and the Charter" (2007) 45 Alta L Rev 43; Jeremy Brown "Pan, Tilt, Zoom: Regulating the Use of Video 
Surveillance of Public Places" (2008) 23 Berkeley Tech L J 755.  
12  See for example Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill (333-2) (select committee report) 
at 1.  
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surveillance occurs when the camera is located on surrounding public land or on private land with 
the occupier's consent.13 This means that the use of trespassory and non-trespassory surveillance 
presents different issues. This is because trespassory surveillance involves police entry onto private 
land, which is unlawful unless specifically authorised,14 whereas non-trespassory surveillance does 
not. 
B  Hamed v R: The Procedural Background 
The Hamed proceedings concerned charges laid against 19 defendants for the unlawful 
possession of a firearm under the Arms Act 1983.15 Four of the defendants were also charged with 
participation in a criminal group contrary to the Crimes Act 1961.16 These charges were laid after an 
18-month police investigation into quasi-military style training camps held on private land in the 
Urewera Ranges.17 As part of this investigation the police had installed unmanned video cameras in 
different areas of that land for month-long periods.18 The Hamed proceedings were a pre-trial 
challenge to the admissibility of the evidence obtained through the police investigation.19 This 
article is focused on the challenge to the admissibility of the evidence obtained through the covert 
video surveillance only. In the High Court decision, reported as R v Bailey, Winklemann J found 
that most of the video camera surveillance evidence was unlawfully obtained, however, she 
admitted the evidence under s 30 of the Evidence Act 2006.20 The defendants appealed this decision 
to the Court of Appeal. This was reported as Hunt v R (Hunt).21 The Court of Appeal found that the 
video surveillance was lawful. The defendants again appealed. In Hamed, the Supreme Court found 
that the police's use of trespassory surveillance amounted to a search under s 21 of NZBORA.22 As 
it was not authorised by any positive authority it was unlawful.23 It was also unreasonable, in breach 
of s 21.24  
  
13  At 2.  
14  Entick v Carrington [1765] 95 ER 807 at 818. 
15  Section 45(1)(b); Hamed v R, above n 4, at [90]. 
16  Section 98A; Hamed v R, above n 4, at [90]. 
17  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [92]. 
18  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [93]–[107]. 
19  At [92]. 
20  R v Bailey HC Auckland CRI-2007-085-7843, 7 October 2009. 
21  Hunt v R [2010] NZCA 528, [2011] 2 NZLR 499.  
22  At [8] per Elias CJ, [171] per Blanchard J and [227] per Tipping J. 
23  At [159] per Blanchard J, [227] per Tipping J and [281] per Gault J. 
24  At [51] per Elias CJ, [178] per Blanchard J, [227] per Tipping J, [263] per McGrath J and [281] per Gault J. 
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C The Provisions of the Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary 
Measures) Act 2011 
The Temporary Act was passed in October 2011 in response to the decision in Hamed.25 The 
Act's main operative provision was s 5. It ensured the "temporary continuation of lawfulness of 
certain uses of video camera surveillance" by providing that "the use of covert video surveillance as 
part of, or in connection with, a search does not of itself render the search unlawful". "Search" is 
defined in s 4 of the Act as:  
an act done by a person or body referred to in section 3(b) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990— 
(a) that is, or is in connection with, a search in respect of which a search warrant has been issued; or  
(b) that is a search where surveillance is conducted from outside the boundaries of the land or place 
under observation. 
Subsection (a) refers to trespassory video surveillance, undertaken in conjunction with a search 
under a s 198 search warrant. Subsection (b) refers to surveillance from outside a property, that is, 
non-trespassory surveillance. This means that the Act encompasses both trespassory surveillance 
and non-trespassory surveillance.  
The aims of the legislation are listed in the purpose section.26 The most important of these 
purposes are: 
(b) to provide a temporary period that will enable Parliament to address in a comprehensive way the 
matters raised in the decision regarding the lawful and appropriate use of video camera surveillance as 
part of law enforcement; and  
(c) to uphold … the deployment of video camera surveillance only to the extent that it was considered to 
be not unlawful in decisions prior to the decision in Hamed; and  
(d) to ensure that the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure set out in section 21 of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is unaffected by the temporary measures put in place by this 
Act (emphasis added.) 
This purpose section reflects the assertions upon which the Bill was premised. The first was the 
assumption that covert video surveillance was considered "not unlawful" to some extent prior to 
Hamed. Politicians claimed that the court had previously examined the use of covert video 
surveillance and found that it was lawful whether "it was conducted on private property entered into 
  
25  Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act, s 2. 
26  Section 3. 
226 (2013) 44 VUWLR 
pursuant to a search warrant or from a place not requiring a warrant to enter."27 That is, the Crown 
claimed that both trespassory and non-trespassory surveillance were previously lawful. The second 
important assertion reflected in the purpose section is that the Bill would not limit the right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
III  PREVIOUS AUTHORITY CONCERNING THE LAWFULNESS 
OF COVERT VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 
The lawfulness of police use of both trespassory and non-trespassory covert video surveillance 
had been challenged in various cases before the courts prior to the matter arising in the Hamed 
proceedings. These challenges to the use of covert video surveillance had been based upon the 
argument that covert video surveillance constitutes a search within the meaning of the word as used 
in s 21 of NZBORA and that its use, without positive authority, is an unreasonable search in breach 
of that section.28 
Section 21 of NZBORA provides that: 
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, 
property, or correspondence or otherwise. 
The courts have taken a two-step approach to this section, first looking at whether the activity 
was a search and secondly at whether the search was unreasonable.29 The Supreme Court has found 
that once this section is breached there is no role for s 5 of NZBORA: an unreasonable search 
cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.30  
This Part of the article will assess the success of this argument in relation first to non-
trespassory and then to trespassory surveillance by looking at the key New Zealand decisions 
concerning video surveillance. This assessment will provide the answer to whether the first assertion 
upon which the Temporary Act was based – that covert video surveillance was lawful to some 
extent prior to Hamed – was accurate.  
A Prior to the Hamed Proceedings, Had the Use of Non-Trespassory 
Video Surveillance Been Found Lawful? 
The Court of Appeal had considered police use of non-trespassory covert video surveillance in 
two key decisions before the Supreme Court's decision in Hamed: R v Fraser (Fraser)31 and R v 
  
27  Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill (333-2) (select committee report) at 1. 
28  R v Fraser, above n 3; R v Gardiner, above n 3; Hamed v R, above n 4.  
29  See Hamed v R, above n 4, at [162]; R v Fraser, above n 3, at 449; R v Gardiner, above n 3, at 137. 
30  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [187]; Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] NZSC 46, [2008] 3 NZLR 774 at [33]. 
31  R v Fraser, above n 3.  
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Gardiner (Gardiner).32 In both of these cases a camera was set up outside of the private property 
under surveillance.33 In both cases the Court refused to identify whether the surveillance amounted 
to a search within the meaning of s 21.34  
Fraser concerned a challenge to the admissibility of evidence obtained through non-trespassory 
video surveillance of a defendant charged under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975. In this case the 
Court said that the touchstone of s 21 was the protection of privacy. However, it held that there was 
no consistent approach as to whether reasonable expectations of privacy were part of the initial test 
for whether a search had occurred, or whether they were only relevant to assessing whether the 
search was reasonable.35 While the Court noted that the White Paper proposal which gave rise to 
NZBORA said that s 21 should extend to new forms of intrusive technologies,36 it felt that non-
trespassory surveillance, which involved no entry onto the premises, presented particularly difficult 
issues in relation to that section.37 For this reason the Court considered that it would be better for it 
to have considered more cases before it attempted to define the elements of search and seizure.38 
Therefore, instead of deciding whether or not the surveillance constituted a search, the Court simply 
looked at whether the activity, if it amounted to a search, was reasonable.39 As s 21 only protects 
against unreasonable searches, in cases where the activity is reasonable, the section will not be 
breached even if it is deemed that there has been a search.  
The Court of Appeal also took this approach in assessing the police behaviour in Gardiner40 and 
in several cases concerning audio electronic participant surveillance 41  and telephone number 
taping.42 In all of these cases the activity was found to be reasonable,43 with the result that the Court 
was never forced to articulate a test for what constitutes a search under s 21. 
  
32  R v Gardiner, above n 3.  
33  R v Fraser, above n 3, at 445; R v Gardiner, above n 3, at 133. 
34  R v Fraser, above n 3, at 452. 
35  At 449. 
36   Geoffrey Palmer "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" [1984-1985] I AJHR A6 at [10.152]. 
37  At 449. 
38  At 449.  
39  At 452. 
40  At 134. 
41  R v Barlow (1995) 2 HRNZ 635 (CA). 
42  R v Wong-Tung (1995) 2 HRNZ 272 (CA). 
43  R v Fraser, above n 3, at 453; R v Gardiner, above n 3, at 137; R v Wong-Tung, above n 42, at 274; R v 
Barlow, above n 41, at 667.  
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Having assumed, for the sake of argument, that video surveillance was a search, the Court in 
Fraser and Gardiner then considered whether undertaking non-trespassory covert video 
surveillance was lawful. It first addressed whether there was any statutory authority for the 
surveillance. Counsel argued that s 198 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 provided a basis for 
undertaking surveillance.44 The relevant part of this section permits a search warrant to be granted 
where there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that there is any "thing" on a place or premises 
which has been or will be used in the commission of an offence, or will be evidence of such an 
offence.45 The Court said that the section was directed at entry into a property to search for "things". 
It did not think that it could be interpreted so as to authorise observations from remote places 
outside of a property.46  
However, the Court rejected the argument put forward by the defendants that, in the absence of 
statutory authority, it was unlawful to carry out surveillance. In Fraser the Court said:47 
Other than s 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, Counsel did not point to any statutory or 
common law prohibition against observing or recording on videotape the open air surrounding a 
residential property and plainly there is none. 
This statement recognises what has been termed the third source of authority for government 
actions.48 This doctrine supports a residual freedom for the police to do things in the course of their 
enquiries which are not prohibited by law.49 That is, the police do not need to point to positive 
authority to allow them do something which would be lawful for an individual to do.50 As there is 
nothing unlawful in setting up a camera on public land, the police do not need authorisation to do 
so. More recently, this approach to police action was applied by Tipping and McGrath JJ in their 
decisions in R v Ngan.51  
In Gardiner, the argument was also raised as to whether, despite the requirements at common 
law, NZBORA meant that there must be prior authorisation for a search.52 This argument was based 
upon that accepted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Malone v United 
  
44  R v Fraser, above n 3, at 452. 
45  Summary Proceedings Act 1957, s 198(1).  
46  R v Fraser, above n 3, at 452; R v Gardiner, above n 3, at 131. 
47  At 452. 
48  Bruce Harris "The 'Third Source' of Authority for Government Action" (1992) 108 LQR 626. 
49  Bruce Harris "The 'Third Source' of Government Action Revisited" (2007) 123 LQR 225 at 227. 
50  R v Ngan [2007] NZSC 105, [2008] 2 NZLR 48 at [45]. 
51  At [45]–[51] and [94]–[100]. 
52  R v Gardiner, above n 3, at 130 and 131. 
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Kingdom.53 It is also the approach taken in Canada54 and the United States.55 In these countries, 
prior judicial authorisation is a prerequisite for a search to be reasonable under the relevant human 
rights legislation. This argument would mean that the doctrine of the third source could not apply to 
warrantless surveillance, as to undertake such surveillance would amount to an unreasonable search 
in contravention of an existing right and would be unlawful. As McGrath J recognised in R v Ngan, 
the third source doctrine can never justify a breach of protected rights.56 However, the Court in 
Gardiner rejected this argument. The Court said that it did not think that NZBORA had had the 
effect to render video surveillance, which was otherwise ungoverned by domestic law, unlawful.57 
This means that following these two cases, undertaking non-trespassory video surveillance 
without statutory authority is lawful at common law. Further, a warrant is not a prerequisite for 
reasonableness under s 21.  
The next question when assessing compliance with s 21 of NZBORA is whether a lawful search 
can nevertheless be unreasonable. In R v Williams the Court of Appeal said that a lawful search will 
not normally be unreasonable.58 However, this statement was made in the context of a search 
authorised by statute. The statute provides safeguards on searches through the warrant regime. A 
warranted search has met certain criteria, which is in effect a check that it is reasonable. In 
comparison, non-trespassory surveillance is lawful in the absence of any warrant regime. 
Consequently, the reasoning that the search will not normally be unreasonable because it is lawful 
does not automatically apply. 
A lawful search might become unreasonable if carried out in an unreasonable manner.59 For 
example, in R v Pratt a lawful strip search was held to be unreasonable because it was carried out in 
public with disregard for the dignity of the person and the time and place it occurred.60 In the 
context of non-trespassory surveillance, Fraser and Gardiner made it clear that the lawfulness of the 
search is not the end of the matter when looking at its reasonableness. In Fraser the Court said that 
when assessing the reasonableness of a search it was necessary to have regard to the circumstances 
at the time of the search and balance the legitimate interests of the individual by reference to 
  
53  Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14. 
54  See R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265 at 278; Hunter v Southam [1984] 2 SCR 145 at [29]; R v Wong [1990] 3 
SCR 36 at [20]–[27]. 
55  See United States v Falls 34 F 3d 674 (8th Cir 1994); United States v Taketa 923 F 2d 665 (9th Cir 1991). 
56  R v Ngan, above n 50, at [97]. 
57  R v Gardiner, above n 3, at 134. 
58  R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [24].  
59  R v Williams, above n 58, at [24].  
60  R v Pratt [1994] 3 NZLR 21 (CA) at 23. 
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reasonable expectations of privacy against the interests of the State in the detection and prosecution 
of crime.61 The Court noted that reasonable expectations of privacy would be less for activities 
readily visible from outside the property than activities within buildings. It concluded that in this 
case there was no evidence that the appellant could have expected that he wouldn't be observed in 
the area upon which the camera was focused. Therefore, it found that the non-trespassory video 
surveillance was not unreasonable.62  
In Gardiner the camera was focused on the back door, kitchen and dining room windows of the 
appellant's house.63 The Court said that covert video surveillance encompassing the interior of a 
building would not normally be reasonable.64 However in this case, the appellants were taking 
precautions against audio interception, the police had strong grounds for suspecting an offence was 
taking place and the camera was not trained on an area of particular privacy. Therefore, the Court 
found that the surveillance was not unreasonable.65  
These two cases show that before the decision in Hamed, the Court had found that non-
trespassory covert video surveillance was lawful despite the lack of a statutory basis for its use. The 
Court had yet to decide whether, and in what circumstances, its use was a search under s 21. 
However, if the Court did find that it amounted to a search then it would be subject to a case-by-
case assessment of reasonableness based on the time, place and circumstances in which it was 
undertaken. Fraser and Gardiner are two examples of situations where the Court considered that the 
use of non-trespassory surveillance was reasonable in the circumstances. These cases do not stand 
for the proposition that non-trespassory surveillance will always be allowed. For example in 
Gardiner the Court explicitly stated that surveillance of the interior of a building was likely to be 
unreasonable. 
B  Prior to the Hamed Proceedings, Had the Use of Trespassory Covert 
Video Surveillance Been Found Lawful? 
The use of trespassory surveillance had come before the courts prior to Hamed in a variety of 
different cases. In an early decision, R v Grayson and Taylor, the Court of Appeal was asked to 
assess the reasonableness of police actions under a search warrant. The police officers had 
  
61  At 453. 
62  At 453. 
63  R v Gardiner, above n 3, at 133. 
64  At 136. 
65  At 136–137. 
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undertaken video recording while on the suspect's property.66 Despite counsel drawing this to the 
Court's attention,67 its use was not the subject of any separate analysis by the Court.68 
In 2007, the Law Commission released a detailed report into New Zealand's search and 
surveillance laws. This questioned the legal basis for trespassory surveillance. 69  The Select 
Committee that examined the Video Camera Surveillance Bill noted that this was the case; however, 
it argued that this report was released before three Court of Appeal decisions affirmed the 
lawfulness of trespassory surveillance.70 The decisions referred to were presumably Tararo v R 
(Tararo),71 Hodgkinson v R (Hodgkinson)72 and Hunt.73   
In Tararo the Supreme Court addressed the use of a video camera by a police officer. In this 
case the undercover police officer had entered onto private property to purchase cannabis. He 
approached the house and transacted with the man who came to the door. This transaction was 
recorded by a video camera concealed on the officer.74 In the Court of Appeal the Court indicated 
that it thought that such surveillance amounted to a search, but it did not decide the case on this 
footing. 75  The Supreme Court did not address this matter. The Supreme Court accepted the 
argument that the police officer had entered the land pursuant to the common law implied licence to 
make an enquiry of the occupier.76 The Court said that this implied licence also allowed a police 
officer to take photographs where this was done to make a record to support the police officer's 
evidence of what he had done or seen on the premises.77 The Court endorsed the view previously 
taken by the Court of Appeal in R v Barlow78 that participant recording would not be inherently 
  
66  R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399 (CA) at 408. 
67  Andrew Butler "The End of Precedent in Bill of Rights Cases? A note on R v Grayson" [1997] NZ L Rev 
274 at 283.  
68  R v Grayson and Taylor, above n 66, at 408. 
69  Law Commission, above n 2. 
70  Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill (333-2) (select committee report) at 2. 
71  Tararo v R [2010] NZSC 157, [2012] 1 NZLR 145. 
72  Hodgkinson v R [2010] NZCA 457. 
73  Hunt v R, above n 21. 
74  Tararo v R, above n 71, at [5] and [6].   
75  At [64]. 
76  At [14]. 
77  At [14].  
78  R v Barlow, above n 41. 
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unreasonable or overstep the boundary of an implied licence where its purpose was to obtain a full 
and accurate record of what was heard or seen.79   
It is important that this judgment is understood in the context of its particular facts and not 
extended to other uses of covert video surveillance. Tararo concerned surveillance being used to 
provide a record of what an officer saw. This is different from an unmanned camera used to record 
what occurs on the land for long stretches of time when the occupants think that they are 
unobserved. In Tararo, entry onto the property was justified under an implied licence to speak to the 
occupier. In contrast the purpose of a s 198 warrant, in conjunction with which most covert video 
surveillance is undertaken, is not to allow the police to speak to an occupier, but to search for 
evidence. 
The next relevant Court of Appeal decision concerning trespassory surveillance was 
Hodgkinson. The appellants in this case were charged with cultivation, supply and possession of 
cannabis for supply under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975.80 The District Court had ruled that all of 
the evidence obtained by the police under a series of search warrants was admissible against the 
appellants.81 One of the warrants was sought by the police to authorise covert trespassory video 
surveillance of private property. This warrant was granted, although it did not in its terms authorise 
the surveillance.82 The District Court judge held that this warrant was improperly issued and the 
material seized under it was seized improperly. However, he ruled the evidence admissible under s 
30 of the Evidence Act 2006.83 The appellants appealed against this finding on the ground that the 
evidence obtained under this warrant should have been excluded.84 The Hodgkinson proceedings 
were brought after the High Court decision in the Hamed proceedings but before the Court of 
Appeal decision. In the High Court decision, R v Bailey, Winkelmann J had found that a s 198 
warrant could not authorise covert video surveillance.85 In light of this decision, the Crown in 
Hodgkinson conceded that the video surveillance was not authorised by the warrant and was 
unlawful.86 However, the Court of Appeal said that it considered it "strongly arguable" that a 
warrant could authorise surveillance.87 Despite this, the Court acknowledged that there was doubt as 
  
79  Tararo v R, above n 71, at [17]. 
80  At [1]. 
81  R v Hodgkinson DC Auckland CRI-2008-090-3991, 12 April 2010 at [66], [69], [98] and [99]. 
82  Hodgkinson v R, above n 72, at [40]. 
83  R v Hodgkinson, above n 81, at [98] and [99]. 
84  Hodgkinson v R, above n 72, at [38]–[40].  
85  R v Bailey, above n 20. 
86  Hodgkinson v R, above n 72, at [42].  
87  Hodgkinson v R, above n 72, at [42] and [43]. 
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to whether a s 198 warrant could authorise surveillance and, in light of the Crown's concession that 
the surveillance was not authorised, the Court proceeded on the assumption that the surveillance was 
not authorised by the warrant and was therefore unlawful.88 This meant that the Court did not need 
to address the issue of whether the surveillance amounted to a search within the meaning of s 21 of 
NZBORA,89 and decided the case on whether the surveillance evidence should have been excluded 
under s 30 of the Evidence Act.90 
The final relevant Court of Appeal decision concerning trespassory video surveillance was its 
decision in the Hamed proceeding itself, Hunt. The Court found that the trespassory surveillance 
undertaken by the police had been authorised by the s 198 warrants. The Court held that provided 
that the use of covert surveillance related to "things" of evidential significance, it was justifiable 
under a warrant.91 The Court said that an intention to conduct surveillance should be disclosed in 
the warrant application. It noted that while it was difficult to envisage circumstances where 
surveillance of a bedroom was justified, if the police could look personally when carrying out a 
search there was no reason in principle why they could not carry out the same sort of surveillance by 
video.92 This decision was of course overturned several months later on appeal to the Supreme 
Court which found that it was incorrect.93  
Neither Hodgkinson nor Tararo support the proposition that trespassory video camera 
surveillance was lawful prior to Hamed. In Hodgkinson the Court simply said that it considered that 
it was arguable that such surveillance could be authorised by a s 198 warrant. It is important to 
remember that this decision came after the police activity in the Hamed proceedings had taken 
place, and consequently cannot be relied upon to justify the police actions in this investigation. 
Neither can it be used to show a long-standing legal position on the legality of covert surveillance. 
The decision in Tararo is confined to the much narrower issue of participant surveillance simply 
being used to provide a record of what the police officer saw when entering under the common law 
doctrine of an implied licence. This means that Hunt is the only Court of Appeal decision that has 
found the use of trespassory surveillance lawful. However, the Select Committee and supporters of 
the Bill relied on these cases to argue that the legal basis of trespassory surveillance had been 
affirmed by the Court of Appeal. This is misleading. R v Bailey found that trespassory surveillance 
  
88  Hodgkinson v R, above n 72, at [45]. 
89  The Court did, however, think that the concept of search in s 198 was wide enough to include surveillance:  
at [42]. This concept is narrower than the term as used in s 21 (see Hamed v R, above n 4, at [164]), so it 
seems likely that it would consider surveillance a search for the purposes of s 21. 
90  Hodgkinson v R, above n 72, at [46]–[54]. 
91  At [37]. 
92  At [41]–[42]. 
93  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [6], [149], [210], [263] and [281]. 
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was unlawful. Hodgkinson noted that there were arguments either way. In this context, one Court of 
Appeal decision that trespassory surveillance was lawful  was not enough to establish a settled legal 
position on the legality of trespassory surveillance from which the Supreme Court's judgment 
departed. 
C Conclusion on the Legality of the Use of Covert Video Surveillance 
Prior to the Decision in Hamed 
This examination of previous case law has shown that the assertion that covert video 
surveillance was lawful prior to the decision in Hamed was incorrect. Although non-trespassory 
surveillance was lawful in certain circumstances, prior to the start of the Hamed proceedings it was 
uncertain at best as to whether trespassory surveillance was lawful. 
IV THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION IN HAMED ON THE 
CONTINUED USE OF VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE 
Throughout the Video Camera Surveillance Bill's passage through Parliament, it was claimed 
that the decision in Hamed represented a departure from the previous authority on covert video 
surveillance.94 Further, the Government stated that Hamed had the following effect:95 
a. The use of covert video surveillance as part of the exercise of a search warrant was unlawful 
b. Non-trespassory surveillance was also likely to be held to be unlawful 
c. If covert video surveillance was unlawful, it was likely to be found to be unreasonable and in breach 
of section 21 of the NZBORA.  
This Part of the article will look at the accuracy of each of these propositions in turn to assess 
the impact of Hamed on the ability of the police to lawfully use trespassory and non-trespassory 
video surveillance as an investigative tool. 
A Post Hamed, Was the Use of Trespassory Video Camera Surveillance 
Unlawful? 
Hamed found that the use of trespassory surveillance was not authorised by warrant and was 
unlawful.96 In order to reach this conclusion, the Court stated for the first time that the use of 
  
94  Crown Law Office Crown Law Report, Justice and Electoral Select Committee: Video Camera Surveillance 
(Temporary Measures) Bill (29 September 2011) at [9]. 
95  Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill (333-1) (explanatory note). See also Crown Law 
Office, above n 94, at [49.8]. 
96  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [51], [159], [178], [227], [263] and [281]. 
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trespassory surveillance in certain circumstances would amount to a search in terms of s 21 of 
NZBORA.97 However, their Honours put forward different tests as to what constitutes a search. 
Blanchard J took a narrow view of "search" and said that a search only occurred when the 
activity invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. 98  This is broadly similar to Elias CJ's 
approach. Her Honour said that s 21 protected privacy and that an activity would be a search when it 
invaded the right to individual freedom from intrusion by the state.99 While Blanchard J said that 
video surveillance in a public space would not normally amount to a search unless perhaps it 
involved vision enhancing devices, Elias CJ said that there was no reason why, by that reason alone, 
surveillance of a public space should be outside the scope of s 21.100  
Tipping J, on the other hand, said that reasonable expectations of privacy should be confined to 
the assessment of reasonableness once a search had been established. He believed that a search 
could occur without any reasonable expectation of privacy being breached.101 Tipping J said that the 
word "search" in s 21 had the ordinary meaning of consciously looking for something or someone. It 
was therefore wide enough to cover watching people or places by the use of technological 
devices.102  
These two contracting approaches to what constitutes a search both have some support in 
previous cases.103 However, while McGrath J did not make it clear whether he agreed with Tipping 
or Blanchard JJ's approach to the test for a search,104 Gault J said that he agreed with Blanchard J's 
reasoning.105 Elias CJ and Blanchard Js' tests are not exactly the same, but their approaches are 
broadly similar. This led the Court of Appeal in Lorigan v R to conclude that while there was no 
clear majority on the matter it was Blanchard J's judgment which had the majority support.106  
  
97  At [8], [171], [221], [265] and [281]. However, Blanchard J took the approach that in this case the 
surveillance of vehicles along Reid Road was not a search as there was not a high expectation of privacy: at 
[171]. 
98  At [163]. 
99  At [10]. 
100  Compare Elias CJ at [12] and Blanchard J at [167]. 
101  At [223]. 
102  At [220]. 
103  Compare for example R v Grayson and Taylor, above n 66, at 406 and R v Ngan, above n 50, at [111]. 
104  At [265]. 
105  At [281]. 
106  Lorigan v R [2012] NZCA 264, (2012) 25 CRNZ 729 at [22]. The Court reached this decision by looking at 
the approaches that Gault and McGrath JJ had taken in previous cases involving video surveillance. In this 
case the Court found that non-trespassory surveillance of a public space is not generally a search, however, 
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Once their Honours had decided that the video camera surveillance was a search, they went on 
to assess whether there was any authority for it. The Court said that the surveillance would be 
unlawful unless it was justified by an implied licence to enter the property, as in Tararo, or by a 
statutory provision.107 The Court rejected the argument that the surveillance could be justified by an 
implied licence for the reason that the police officers were not on the land to communicate with the 
occupiers.108 The Court also rejected the argument that the surveillance could be authorised by a s 
198 search warrant.109 Their Honours said that this was because the section was restricted to 
authorising entry to search for things which were believed to be on the property at the time the 
warrant was applied for.110 Video surveillance did not come within this section because it was 
prospective in nature. Further, its use could not properly be regarded as a search for "things". Its 
purpose was to search for people in relation to those things.111 As the warrant did not extend to 
surveillance, this meant that when the police undertook the surveillance they overstepped the 
authority of the warrant and were trespassing. This being the case, the surveillance was unlawful.112 
Following the decision in Hamed, the use of trespassory surveillance as part of a search warrant 
was therefore unlawful. 
B  Post Hamed, Was the Use of Non-Trespassory Covert Video 
Surveillance Likely to be Held to be Unlawful? 
The Crown's reading of the decision in Hamed was that it could be interpreted by future courts 
in such a way that police would be required to have a warrant for non-trespassory surveillance to be 
lawful. 113  Due to the different approaches taken by Elias CJ, Blanchard and Tipping JJ this 
proposition has to be carefully examined. Its accuracy depends upon whether the judgments are read 
as extending to non-trespassory surveillance or confined to trespassory surveillance.  
In his judgment Tipping J said that he endorsed the view taken in R v Ngan and considered that 
the police were entitled to do anything which any member of the public would be able to do in the 
same circumstances.114 As it would be lawful for a private citizen to set up a camera on public 
  
surveillance using a camera with night-filming capacity would involve a search as this allowed it to film 
images not visible to the naked eye. 
107  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [161], [219] and [281]. 
108  At [161], [219] and [281]. 
109  At [47], [149], [210] and [281]. 
110  At [146]. 
111  At [150] per Blanchard J and [209] per Tipping J. 
112  At [175].  
113  Crown Law Office, above n 94, at [9] and [49]. 
114  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [217]. 
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property, 115  Tipping J's remarks about the lawfulness of the search are clearly confined to 
trespassory surveillance.  
Elias CJ took the opposite approach and held that the police act unlawfully when they do not 
have specific statutory authority for intruding upon personal freedoms. Specific authority, her 
Honour said, is required both at common law and under NZBORA. 116  This means that once 
surveillance amounts to a search within the meaning of s 21, it must be authorised by statute to be 
lawful. Following Elias CJ's approach, both trespassory and non-trespassory surveillance are 
unlawful unless authorised by warrant.  
While the scope of Elias CJ and Tipping J's judgments are clear, Blanchard J's judgment is 
somewhat more ambiguous. It is Blanchard J's approach which has created disagreement as to the 
potential wider application of the decision in Hamed. This disagreement has been based upon the 
interpretation of one particular passage in Blanchard J's judgment where he said:117 
In this case the video camera surveillance was not authorised by any warrant. Even in the instances 
when the police had a valid warrant to enter the land concerned, they still had no right to carry out the 
surveillance and were trespassing when they installed video cameras.  
There are two possible ways to interpret this statement. Taking a narrow approach, this 
statement is confined to trespassory surveillance: the video surveillance was beyond the scope of the 
warrant and so by undertaking it, the police officers overstepped their authority and became 
trespassers.118 However, a broader reading of the statement could interpret Blanchard J as simply 
saying that there was no law that gave the police officers the "right" to undertake the trespassory 
surveillance. There is similarly no law which gives the police officers the "right" to undertake non-
trespassory surveillance, so the same reasoning would apply to non-trespassory surveillance and it 
would also be unlawful.119 
In Lorigan v R, the Court of Appeal said that it considered Tipping J's approach towards police 
powers to have the support of the majority of the judges.120 This means that it understood Blanchard 
J's judgment as consistent with Tipping J's and read Blanchard J's above remark about warrants as 
confined to trespassory surveillance.  
  
115  There are several minor exceptions to this general position, for example "peeping and peering" into a 
dwellinghouse at night: see Law Commission, above n 2, at [11.19] and [11.20]. 
116  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [38]. 
117  At [175]. 
118  Crown Law Office, above n 94, at [45]. 
119  At [9].  
120  Lorigan v R, above 106, at [30]. 
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A narrow reading of Blanchard J's judgment was also supported by submitters on the Video 
Surveillance Bill. For example, Andrew Geddis took the view that nothing in the majority 
judgments in Hamed could be read as saying that the police must have specific authority in law to 
undertake non-trespassory surveillance.121 
This approach to the passage of Blanchard J's judgment quoted above seems correct in the wider 
context of Blanchard J's judgment and those of the other Justices. Elias CJ was emphatic in her 
rejection of the reasoning in both Fraser and Gardiner.122 In contrast, Blanchard J referred briefly 
to Fraser in the context of the test for a reasonable search.123 In Fraser, the Court found that there 
was no need for statutory authorisation for non-trespassory surveillance to be lawful. Given this 
context, it would be odd if Blanchard J intended the somewhat ambiguous language in the above 
paragraph to be seen as disagreeing with the fundamental reasoning behind that case – that prior 
authorisation for non-trespassory surveillance was not a prerequisite for its use to be reasonable.  
In conclusion, the correct reading of Hamed is that the majority's comments on the need for 
specific authorisation for a search are confined to trespassory surveillance. This means that 
following Hamed, non-trespassory surveillance was not likely to be found to be unlawful, unless it 
was unreasonable. 
C  If the Use of Covert Video Surveillance Was Unlawful, Was it Likely 
to be Found to be Unreasonable? 
The final proposition in the Bill's explanatory note was that given that covert video surveillance 
had been found to be unlawful, it was also likely to be held unreasonable. Due to the finding on the 
previous point, this proposition is only relevant to trespassory surveillance.  
There has been considerable disagreement over the proper relationship between the lawfulness 
and the reasonableness of a search. In Hamed, Elias CJ, Blanchard and Tipping JJ took different 
approaches to this relationship.   
With the exception of Elias CJ, all the Justices said that unlawfulness and unreasonableness 
were distinct concepts.124 Blanchard J said that normally a search would be unreasonable where it 
was established that it was unlawful, however, an exception would be where the unlawfulness was 
  
121  Andrew Geddis "Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Video Camera Surveillance 
(Temporary Measures) Bill 2011" at [4]. 
122  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [32]. 
123  At [163]. 
124  At [174] per Blanchard J and [226] per Tipping J. McGrath J said that he agreed that unlawfulness and 
unreasonableness were distinct concepts, at [263]. Gault J said that he agreed with Blanchard J's reasoning, 
at [281]. 
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minor or technical or perhaps where the police had a reasonable but erroneous belief that they were 
acting lawfully.125  
Blanchard J's approach is consistent with the approach taken to the relationship between 
lawfulness and reasonableness since R v Shaheed.126 Prior to this decision, the Court said that the 
time, place and circumstances of the search should be assessed to establish whether or not the search 
was reasonable. 127  This had allowed the courts to assess the reasonableness of a search 
independently of its unlawfulness. However, in R v Shaheed the Court acknowledged that this 
approach was inappropriate, was not based on principle, and was a result of the prima facie 
exclusion of evidence rule.128 This rule meant that evidence obtained in breach of s 21 would be 
excluded unless there was good reason to admit it.129 Courts were therefore reluctant to say that s 21 
had been breached, as the likely result of such a finding was that the evidence would be excluded.130 
Following the replacement of this rule in Shaheed with a balancing test,131 the Court has found a 
closer relationship between unlawfulness and unreasonableness. Thus in R v Williams the Court said 
that an unlawful search would ordinarily be unreasonable,132 with the possible exception of when 
the unlawfulness was due to a minor or technical error.133 This exception meant that there was no 
risk of trivialising the s 21 right by the section being breached on a technicality.134 
Tipping J's approach in Hamed to unlawfulness and unreasonableness was similar to Blanchard 
J's. His Honour said that an unlawful search was well on the way towards being unreasonable:135   
A party propounding the view that [an unlawful search] was nevertheless not unreasonable carries a 
significant persuasive burden, but that is not to say that the burden can never be satisfied.  
However, the wording of this statement is more flexible than that found in Blanchard J's 
judgment and could possibly be used to argue that an unlawful search was reasonable in 
circumstances outside of those exceptions noted by Blanchard J and the previous cases. Despite this, 
  
125  At [174]. 
126  R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA); R v Williams, above n 58, at [16]–[20].  
127  R v Grayson and Taylor, above n 66, at 407. 
128  R v Shaheed, above n 126, at [144]; Hamed v R, above n 4, at [173].  
129  R v Shaheed, above n 126, at [144]. See also R v Williams, above n 58, at [14]. 
130  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [173]; R v Williams, above n 58, at [15]. 
131  R v Shaheed, above n 126, at [144]. This test was subsequently codified in the Evidence Act 2006, s 30. 
132  At [16]. 
133  At [19]. 
134  At [21]. 
135  At [226]. 
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subsequent cases indicate that Blanchard J's approach will be followed. For example in Orendowicz 
v R Allan J found the surveillance unlawful.136 He then went on to say "this being the case, the 
search was also unreasonable."137 He stated, citing Blanchard J, that an unlawful search would 
normally be unreasonable unless the illegality was minor or technical.138  
In contrast to Blanchard J's approach, Elias CJ argued that an unlawful search is by that very 
fact unreasonable. She said it could not be reasonable for law enforcement officers to act 
unlawfully.139 This approach is not without support. It was favoured in the dissenting judgment of 
McKay J in R v Jefferies,140 and is the approach taken in Canada.141 Her Honour believed that to 
hold otherwise would turn the test for whether s 21 was breached into a stand-alone test of the 
reasonableness of the police conduct irrespective of its illegality. This, she argued, would give the 
Court the ultimate power to decide the bounds of police conduct rather than assessing 
reasonableness based on whether the action was within the powers Parliament had granted the 
police.142  
The majority decision in Hamed embraces the close relationship between lawfulness and 
reasonableness which has been favoured since Shaheed. An unlawful search will ordinarily be 
unreasonable unless it comes within one of the exceptions; that is, if the unlawfulness was only 
minor or technical. These exceptions acknowledge that it is the test for unreasonableness that 
Parliament has chosen for compliance with s 21,143 and they ensure that a finding of a breach of that 
section has serious implications.144 
This means that the final proposition in the Bill's explanatory note, at least with respect to 
trespassory surveillance, was correct: as trespassory surveillance was unlawful, it was likely to be 
unreasonable unless it was seen as only a minor or technical departure from the lawfulness of the 
search. 
  
136  Orendowicz v R HC Tauranga CRI-2011-470-000013, 26 September 2011.  
137  At [18]. 
138  At [18]. 
139  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [50]. 
140  R v Jefferies [1994] 1 NZLR 290 (CA) at 316. 
141  See R v Collins, above n 54, at 278. 
142  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [19] and [50]. 
143  See Hamed v R, above n 4, at [226]. See also R v Ngan, above n 50, at [53] per Tipping J. 
144  R v Williams, above n 58, at [21]. 
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V  THE IMPACT OF THE VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE 
(TEMPORARY MEASURES) ACT 2011 
The final Part of this article will examine in more detail the effect of the Act on the law and its 
potential impact on the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
A What Was the Effect of the Act on the Lawfulness of Covert Video 
Surveillance? 
The Temporary Act provided that the use of a video camera as part of, or in connection with a 
search would not of itself make the search unlawful. With regards to non-trespassory surveillance, 
this was unnecessary as such surveillance was already lawful at common law. The decision in 
Hamed did not change this. The definition of "search" in the Act encompasses non-trespassory 
surveillance "that is a search".145 It therefore consolidates the approach taken in Hamed, that there 
does not need to be physical trespass for a search to occur. 
The Act provided that trespassory surveillance was not "of itself" unlawful. The Act was meant 
to overrule the finding in Hamed that trespassory surveillance was unlawful. However, there is a 
strong argument that the Act would not have authorised covert video surveillance where a warrant 
was sought for the sole purpose of undertaking video surveillance.146 The Act seems to proceed on 
the basis that in the case of trespassory video surveillance, the police should state their intention to 
undertake the surveillance when applying for a warrant. This was what the Court of Appeal in Hunt 
had recommended147 and, according to evidence at the Select Committee hearing, this was the usual 
practice of the police.148 However, the Act did not change the Supreme Court's ruling that s 198 
could not authorise an anticipatory warrant, 149  and the finding that video surveillance was 
anticipatory in nature.150 A warrant sought solely for surveillance would therefore be outside the 
scope of that section. This means that the Act may only have rendered trespassory surveillance 
lawful where it was undertaken incidentally to a search for "things" believed to be on the premises 
at the time the warrant was applied for.151 This argument is also supported by the wording of the 
statute itself. The words "as part of" and "in connection with" imply that a search which consists 
solely of video surveillance is not contemplated by the legislation. While it is unlikely that such 
searches occur often, this implication strengthens the argument that the act was poorly drafted. Not 
  
145  Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Act, s 4(b).  
146  Samuel Beswick and William Fortherby "Surveilling the Stopgap" [2011] NZLJ 404 at 406. 
147  Hunt v R, above n 21, at [42]. 
148  Justice and Electoral Committee, above n 1, at 76. 
149  Hamed v R, above n 4, at [149]. 
150  At [150]. 
151  Beswick and Fortherby, above n 146, at [406]. 
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only did it extend unnecessarily to non-trespassory surveillance, it did not cover all instances of 
trespassory surveillance. 
B Did the Act Limit the Right to be Free from Unreasonable Search and 
Seizure Contained in s 21 of NZBORA? 
The final issue that this article will address is whether the Temporary Act was inconsistent with 
the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Section 7 of NZBORA requires the 
Attorney-General to report to Parliament where a Bill appears to be inconsistent with any of the 
rights and freedoms in the Act. Following official advice,152 the Attorney-General did not report on 
this Bill; that is, he considered it consistent with the right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure. This conclusion was heavily criticised by opposition parties,153 as well as several key 
submitters on the Bill, including the New Zealand Law Society and the Council for Civil 
Liberties.154  
1  The Argument that the Bill was Consistent with s 21: the Official Advice 
The official advice said the Bill was designed to correct a technical deficiency in the law only. 
All that the Bill did was prevent the Court from finding that a search was unlawful solely because 
covert video surveillance was used.155 Surveillance could still be unlawful because of any other 
deficiency in the authorisation or execution of the search. Additionally, the Court could still assess 
surveillance under s 21 and find it unreasonable because, in the circumstances of that case, it was 
unreasonable to undertake covert video surveillance.156 These factors led the advisors to conclude 
that the Bill did not limit the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.157  
2  The Alternative Viewpoint   
The contrasting view, that the Bill was inconsistent with s 21, is based upon the close 
relationship that the Court has recognised between unlawfulness and unreasonableness. For example 
the Law Society argued that the concepts of lawfulness and reasonableness are very closely related 
  
152  Public Law Group and the Office of Legal Counsel Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill 
(2011): Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (27 September 2011) at [30]. 
153  (27 September 2011) 676 NZPD 21454; Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill 2011 (333-
2) (select committee report) at 5–9. 
154  New Zealand Law Society "Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Video Camera 
Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill 2011" at 21; New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties "Submission 
to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Video Camera Surveillance (Temporary Measures) Bill 2011" 
at [3]; Justice and Electoral Committee, above n 1, at 31–43.   
155  Public Law Group and the Office of Legal Counsel, above n 152, at [18]. 
156  At [20]–[21].  
157  At [30]. 
 THE VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE (TEMPORARY MEASURES) ACT 2011: AN UNPRECEDENTED LICENCE TO SEARCH? 243 
 
 
and cannot be separated into two distinct topics. It argued that by legislating on the issue of the 
lawfulness of a search, the Bill automatically interfered with the ability of a judge to carry out his or 
her normal functions under s 21 and took away a whole dimension of the analysis conducted under 
this section.158  
As explained above, the Bill did not change the exercise that the judge would be undertaking 
under s 21 in relation to non-trespassory surveillance. Courts had proceeded on the basis that non-
trespassory surveillance was lawful despite the lack of positive authorisation for its use.159 In the 
absence of a warrant regime regulating the deployment of non-trespassory surveillance, there was a 
lot of room for the Court to assess whether the non-trespassory surveillance, although lawful, was 
unreasonable because of the circumstances in which it was undertaken. The Temporary Act 
similarly did not provide any restrictions on the use of non-trespassory surveillance. The legislative 
history and purpose section of the Act make it clear that the Act was meant to preserve the ability of 
a judge to assess whether the surveillance was unreasonable.160 This means that at common law and 
under the Act, non-trespassory surveillance was lawful unless the circumstances in which it was 
conducted rendered it unreasonable. As the legal position was not changed in relation to non-
trespassory covert video surveillance, the right to be free from unreasonable search was not affected. 
The situation in relation to trespassory surveillance, however, is different. The majority in 
Hamed found that trepassory surveillance was unlawful because it required positive authority to 
undertake and there was no statute capable of providing this authorisation. The starting point when 
assessing the use of trespassory surveillance was the fact that it was unlawful. As an unlawful 
search, it would be unreasonable unless it came within one of the exceptions, that is, if its use was 
only a minor or technical departure from legality.161 In R v Williams the Court said that what is a 
minor departure should not be given an expansive meaning.162 The Court pointed to the failure to 
file a report after a warrantless search as an example of a minor breach.163 It said that a mistake such 
as specifying the wrong property in a warrant, or failure of the police to identify themselves if this 
were a requirement of the statute should not be regarded as minor breaches.164 In Hamed itself, 
Tipping J found that the surveillance of vehicles on Reid Road was an unlawful search but not 
unreasonable because there was a low expectation of privacy pertaining to the fact that a driver has 
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travelled along a public road.165 It is important to remember that Tipping J took a wider approach to 
the relationship between unlawfulness and unreasonableness, which was not the majority approach. 
Further, Tipping J also used a different definition of "search". His judgment contrasts to Blanchard 
J's judgment in which his Honour held that the surveillance of Reid Road did not amount to a 
search, because the surveillance only captured images of vehicles moving along the road, about 
which there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.166 Applying the test from Blanchard J's 
judgment in Hamed, where the only exception to an unlawful search being unreasonable is a minor 
or technical departure from lawfulness, it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which the 
deployment of a video camera could be regarded as only a minor or technical departure from 
legality.167 If video surveillance is, because it is prospective in nature, beyond the scope of a 
warrant, its use can hardly be a minor departure from it, especially when what is a minor departure 
should be given a restrictive interpretation. The significance of this is that, because it was unlawful 
and was unlikely to be regarded as only technically unlawful, prior to the Act, trespassory covert 
video surveillance was likely to always be found to be an unreasonable search.  
The Temporary Act provided that the use of covert video surveillance as part of a search 
authorised under a s 198 warrant would not be unlawful for the sole reason that a camera was 
employed.168 The Act did not amend the s 198 warrant regime. The consequence of this is that the 
finding in Hamed that such a warrant could not authorise surveillance was not changed by the Act. 
The long-established position is that, with the exception of an implied licence, officials must have a 
warrant to enter onto private property. If they do something which is beyond the scope of that 
warrant then that is unlawful and they are trespassing.169 The effect of the Act is to say that despite 
this, it is lawful to go onto land as authorised by a warrant and overstep the scope of the warrant's 
authority by undertaking surveillance. Further, the Act did not provide any more judicial oversight 
for the undertaking of video surveillance. Because a s 198 warrant cannot authorise video 
surveillance, a judge could not have issued a search warrant but refused to authorise surveillance 
under it, as the warrant could not authorise the surveillance in the first place. The result of this is 
that once there are reasonable grounds for issuing a search warrant, undertaking surveillance is 
prima facie lawful. 
As the official advice on the Bill states, the Act preserves the ability of a court to find that, 
notwithstanding its legality, the use of trespassory surveillance was unreasonable in the particular 
circumstances. Post-Hamed, a citizen could rely on the fact that trespassory surveillance was not 
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authorised and could be fairly certain this would lead to a finding that its use was unreasonable in 
breach of NZBORA. However, under the Temporary Act, there would have to be something over 
and above the fact that trespassory surveillance occurred before a court could find that the search 
was unreasonable. The Court could not rely on the fact that the police had overstepped the scope of 
the warrant by undertaking surveillance in order to hold that the search was unreasonable, as under 
the Act it was not unlawful to do just that. This means that the position of what is a reasonable 
search was fundamentally changed by the Act. The Act meant that the use of trespassory covert 
video surveillance was presumptively reasonable, as it was lawful, unless there were additional 
factors to make its use unreasonable in the particular circumstances.  
The Court has said that lawfulness and reasonableness are distinct concepts. However, it is 
overly simplistic to rely on this to argue that legislation ruling on the lawfulness of a search does not 
affect the issue of reasonableness, and therefore that, because s 21 concerns reasonableness, it will 
not be breached by such legislation. Such an argument ignores the Court's approach to these two 
concepts. In particular it ignores the very limited ability of the Court to assess the reasonableness of 
a warranted search independently of its lawfulness. The position is that an unlawful search will 
ordinarily be unreasonable while a search authorised by warrant will not normally be unreasonable. 
Although the Court has found several exceptions to the proposition that an unlawful search will 
normally be unreasonable, the nature of trespassory video surveillance makes it very unlikely that its 
use in conjunction with a s 198 warrant would, prior to the act, have been regarded as falling within 
these exceptions.  
The Act changed the lawful status of covert video surveillance. The Court's approach to the 
concepts of legality and reasonableness mean that in doing this, it changed the position of what will 
prima facie be a reasonable search. Further, it did this in a way which makes it lawful, and therefore 
not in itself unreasonable, for police officers to overstep the scope of a s 198 warrant. This goes 
against the fundamental legal position that the police must have a warrant to enter onto private 
property and if they act outside the scope of this warrant, their actions are unlawful170 and, unless 
the unlawfulness was minor, unreasonable. Bearing this in mind, it is not possible to say that the Act 
was consistent with the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.  
VI CONCLUSION 
The Temporary Act was based on the assertion that covert video surveillance had been ruled to 
be lawful prior to Hamed and that Hamed meant that both trespassory and non-trespassory 
surveillance were likely to be held unlawful. This article has argued that both of these premises were 
incorrect. This resulted in the Act applying unnecessarily to non-trespassory surveillance. Further, 
the Act did not apply to all uses of trespassory surveillance because it did not amend s 198 of the 
Summary Proceedings Act 1957 and consequently could not authorise a warrant for the sole purpose 
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of video surveillance. This meant that the Act did not adequately fulfil the purpose for which it was 
enacted. The Temporary Act was inconsistent with the fundamental common law rules restricting 
police entry onto private property. It provided that it was not unlawful for the police to undertake 
surveillance pursuant to a warrant which was not capable of authorising such activity. Finally, the 
Act was inconsistent with the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed in s 
21 of NZBORA.   The argument put forward in favour of the Temporary Act was that it was a 
legally insignificant but important temporary measure. This article has shown that this was not the 
case. Rather, the Act disregarded the established common law position concerning police entry onto 
private property and limited a fundamental right. 
The Temporary Act was an example of rushed and poorly-drafted legislation. While it can be 
accepted that covert video surveillance is an important tool that the police need to be able to use, 
providing authority for its use was not the only issue at stake. The major flaws in the Act show how 
important it is for the Crown to step back and undertake a thorough exploration of the law and the 
implications of any potential action instead of reactively legislating in the face of an adverse court 
ruling. In the absence of any such consideration, the Act set a dangerous precedent for ill-considered 
legislative action disguised as a harmless restatement of previous law. 
 
